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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GERALD J. CREASON and
VIOLA M. CREASON and
HALLMARK CONSTRUCTORS,
INC., a corporation,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

i

1

Case No.
11878

v.
ARNT LeROY PETERSON and
RUBY ,V. PETERSON, his wife,

Defendants-Appellants.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
POINT I
THE OLD FENCE IS THE BEST AND
ONLY EVIDENCE OF THE STARTING
POINT OF THE DESCRIPTION.
Respondents seem to argue that the old fence
cannot be relied upon as the beginning point because
there is no evidence that it was built on the point "9.2
1

chains north of the center of the intersection". Respondents at Page 6 of their brief urge this court to
take judicial notice that old fences are often not 011
the true line. This argument misses the whole point
of appellants' contention as set forth in Points II
' '
and III of appellants' main brief. Appellants there
contend that when the property was originally laid
out in 1875 in the deed from the patentee to Joseph
Thompson, (abstract pg. 2) the point 9.2 chains north
of the center of the intersection was designated to be
in line with an old fence. The description says so and
so· do 13 succeeding documents in the abstract right
down to 1943. It matters not whether the original survey laying out the property was accurate or not,. It is
sufficient that originally it was so designated and has
been so practically located by everyone from 1875 to
1963, a period of 88 years. All monuments, markers and
pegs used in the 1875 survey have long since disappeared. The question now is where was the point 9.2
chains north of the intersection originally located when
the description was first employed in 1875-not where
it should have been located. As stated by Justice Cooley
in Diehl v. Zanger, 39 Mich. 601, quoted with approval
by the Supreme Court of Arizona in 'V acker v. Price,
(1950) 70 Ariz. 99, 216 P. 2d 707: "Nothing is better
understood than that few of our early plats will stand
the test of a careful and accurate survey without disclosing errors. This is true of the government surveys
as well as any others, and if all the lines were now
subject to correction on new surveys, the confusion of
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lines and titles that would follow would be simply inand the visitation of the surveyor might
ealcula
'' ;_'ll be set down as a great public calamity. But no
law can sanction this course. . . . The question is not
how an entirely accurate survey would locate these
lots, but how the original stakes located them." Some
courts have described this process of re-tracing the
original survey as "fallowing the footsteps" of the
original surveyor.
There is another reason why it matters not that
the old fence may not have been established exactly
on the point 9.2 chains north of the center of the intersection. It is well recognized law that a call in a description to a specific point such as a fence line prevails
over a distance. 11 CJS Sec. 51 on Boundaries. Thus,
even though the fence was more or less than 9.2 chains
north, the call to the fence governs and makes the fence
the north boundary of the property.
Respondents argue in their brief that the source
of the dispute in this case is the failure of the appellants to make reference to the fence when they conveyed
the property to respondents in December, 1963. That
is not so. Whether the fence is mentioned or not, all
parties who have had anything to do with this property since 1875 (including respondents when they purchased it) have regarded this fence as the north boundary. Appellants purchased it in 1943, had it surveyed
by a Mr. McDonald, and found no problem. R. 151.
This was 3 years before the first monument was ever
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placed in the center of the intersection. The old fence
monument itself of where the point 9.2 chains north
of the intersection was originally located and where
by practical location it was maintained for 88 years
prior to respondents' purchase of the property. Respondents suggest that when the reference to the fence
is omitted, a different tract of property was conveyed
than when the fence was specifically mentioned in
earlier instruments. This argument overlooks the intention of the parties which is paramount in construing
a description in a deed. 26 CJS Sec. 100 on Deeds. It
also overlooks the fence as the only monument remaining of an early survey. Whether the fence is mentioned or not, the same north line viz. the old fence,
has always been meant.
Respondents apparently derive some comfort from
the fact that all three surveyors at the trial said that
in surveying the property today they would go about
it as did Coon and King for the respondents. However, all three surveyors qualified their answers by
saying that they do not, as surveyors, try 'to locate where
the courts or the law would fix the property line. (R.
81, 136, 144). In other words, they did not presume to
know the law regarding location of old points. Robert
Jones, the respondents' surveyor, acknowledged that
in surveying it is proper to refer to earlier deeds in
the chain of title to see if a call is made to a fence, but
that in this instance he did not have the benefit of
the abstract. (R. 89-90). He further acknowledged
that the center of an intersection might change over
4

a period of 80 years and that this determination of
where that point is today would not necessarily be the
same as it was in 1875. (R. 82). This court in Reese
v. Murdock, 121 Utah 517, 243 P. 2d 948, rejected
the surveys of two private surveyors and the county
surveyor and fixed the beginning point of the property there involved at a point on an old fence line which
by practical location of the parties had been the starting
point for over 50 years.
Respondents' argument would lead to the result
that every time property is sold, the description must
be checked with any new monuments which have been
established, and if the description no longer fits, the
description must be revised. Think of the chaos this
would result in .When one owner revises his description
to meet new surveys, it usually makes the new description conflict with the description of neighboring property and a whole chain of conflicts is started. It was
that situation which Justice Cooley in Diehl v. Zanger,
39 Mich. 601, called a "great public calamity".
In conclusion, there is no evidence to support
Judge Elton's apparent determination that the starting
point of the property was a few feet north of the old
fence. The Coon and King survey was tied to a new
monument established in 1946, and ignores the only
monument of the original survey viz. the old fence.
The law requires that the starting point be found as it
was originally located. On that question, the old fence
is the best and only evidence of where that point was
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originally located. Additional reasons ·why the old
fence should be regarded as the starting point are:
I. 13 successive references to it in the chain of

title as being the north boundary.
2. Practical location of the starting point on the
old fence by the owners thereof for 88 years.
3. As pointed out at Page 22 of appellants' main

brief, the description is ambiguous since the center of
the intersection as now located will not fit the tie to
the 16th corner, thereby increasing the necessity for
reference to a point on the ground.
4. The rule of law that an omission in a subse-

quent description cannot enlarge the boundaries of the
land conveyed by deed. (See Page 24 of appellants'
main brief) .
5. The intention of the parties (respondents and
appellants alike) that the fence was the north boundary
when the property was bought and sold in December,

1963.

POINT II

NONE OF THE COVENANTS OF THE
\V ARRANTY DEED HA VE BEEN BROKEN.
Respondents claim at Point III of their brief that
because they did not get possession of the strip north
of the old fence there has been a breach of the covenants. They totally ignore the fact that the law requires
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that they prove that the claimant Erekson has paramount :itle. Respondents blandly assert that Erekson
i1<ts title by adverse possession or by acquiescence. Respondents want this court to assume such facts. This
court in Van Cott v. Jacklin, 63 Utah 412, 226 Pac.
460, made the grantee prove that the third party claimant had paramount title by bringing suit against him
first. Van Cott v. Casper, 53 Utah 161, 176 Pac. 849.
Matters of priority of titles are never assumed. They
are proved in courts of law when all interested parties
are parties litigant. The authorities relied upon by
respondents at Pages 9 and IO of their brief require
that the claimant have paramount title. That has never
been shown because respondents have never tested
Erekson's title. They want this court to save them that
trouble and assume that Erekson's title is paramount.
They even want to assume that Erekson's description
fits up against the old fence, which is contrary to their
contention that they were conveyed the strip north
of the old fence. Also, if respondents are correct that
their description included the strip north of the old
fence, then appellants and their predecessors in title
have been paying the taxes upon it since 1875, and
adverse possession by Erekson would have been impossible.
If this court can assume, as respondents urge, that
Erekson owns up to the old north fence by the doctrine
of boundary by acquiescence, then this court should
also assume that appellants owned up to the fences on
the east and south of the property, and hence it was
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unnecessary for respondents to spend any time or money
in obtaining quitclaim deeds from the adjoining owners
on the east (.Ferguson) and the south (Aoki ana Alpaugh).
POINT III
Respondents do not cite any authority whatever
in opposition to the authorities in Point V of appel-

lants' main brief to the effect that in a breach of covenant suit, attorney's fees are not recoverable when
incurred in clearing clouds from the title. They do
not cite any authority contrary to appellants' statement
that attorney's fees can be recovered in a breach of
covenant action only when the fees were expended in
the unsuccessful defense of the title conveyed such as
occurred in Van Cott v. Jacklin, 63 Utah 412, 236
Pac. 460. Respondents simply ignore these authorities
and plead that the title conveyed was "defective'', that
respondents had to "satisfy" their grantees, and that
they were mitigating damages when they obtained the
quitclaim deeds from Ferguson, Aoki and Alpaugh.
No cases have been cited, however, where attorney's
fees were allowed under the guise of mitigating damages. If the court were to so allow them it would be
going further than any case found by appellants. This
court should adhere to the rule of Van Cott v. Jacklin
supra, Sec. 57-1-12, UCA 1953, and the cases at 61
ALR 169, and allow fees only when incurred in the
unsuccessful defense of the title conveyed. There was
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litigation here and respondents incurred no fees in
def c·1ding the title conveyed.
111•

Respondents have mistaken the law as to the liability of the grantors-appellants to them. In their brief
at Pages 4, IO, 11 and 12, they mention what respondents did to "satisfy" their grantee ( Sieverts Brothers)
and argue that appellants are liable for that cost. The
law does not impose the duty on the warrantor to
"satisfy" the grantee or successive grantees. The liability of the warrantor is specifically defined in Sec.
57-1-12, UCA 1953, and nowhere does the word "satisfy" there appear. The duty imposed is to protect
against "lawful claims". As this court held in Utah
Savings and Trust v. Stoutt, 36 Utah 206, 102 Pac.
865, the covenants do not even protect against an unmarketable title. Thus, even if we were to assume that
appellants conveyed respondents an unmarketable title,
respondents cannot recover anything in this suit for
breach of covenants. Their remedy would have been
to have sued upon the real estate contract, but
an
action would have to be brought before the execution
and delivery of the warranty deed. This is because
the contract is merged into the deed and thereafter the
grantor-seller is liable, if at all, only on the covenants
of the deed and the terms of the contract cannot be
sued upon. See Utah Savings and Trust Co. v. Stoutt,
supra, and Knight v. Southern Pacific Co., 52 Utah
42, 176 Pac. 689.
There was no suit between the respondents and
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their grantee and hence, there has been no judicial
determination of whether the demands of Sieverts ·
Brothers were lawful or not. Clearly, appelbnts are
not liable for costs expended by respondents to "satisfy"
Sieverts Brothers.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD C. HOWE
Attorney for Appellants
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